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Secrecy Capacity Scaling in
Large Cooperative Wireless Networks
Mahtab Mirmohseni and Panagiotis Papadimitratos
Abstract
We investigate large wireless networks subject to security constraints. In contrast to point-to-point,
interference-limited communications considered in prior works, we propose active cooperative relaying
based schemes. We consider a network with nl legitimate nodes, ne eavesdroppers, and path loss exponent
α ≥ 2. As long as n2e(log(ne))γ = o(nl), for some positive γ, we show one can obtain unbounded secure
aggregate rate. This means zero-cost secure communication, given fixed total power constraint for the
entire network. We achieve this result through (i) the source using Wyner randomized encoder and a serial
(multi-stage) block Markov scheme, to cooperate with the relays and (ii) the relays acting as a virtual
multi-antenna to apply beamforming against the eavesdroppers. Our simpler parallel (two-stage) relaying
scheme can achieve the same unbounded secure aggregate rate when n
α
2 +1
e (log(ne))
γ+δ(α2 +1) = o(nl)
holds, for some positive γ, δ. Finally, we study the improvement (to the detriment of legitimate nodes) the
eavesdroppers achieve in terms of the information leakage rate in a large cooperative network in case of
collusion. We show that again the zero-cost secure communication is possible, if n(2+
2
α
)
e (logne)
γ = o(nl)
holds, for some positive γ; i.e., in case of collusion slightly fewer eavesdroppers can be tolerated compared
to the non-colluding case.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The open nature of wireless networks makes them vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks; thus, confi-
dentiality is a crucial security requirement. Conventional, cryptographic techniques have drawbacks, e.g.,
increasing, with the network size, key management complexity. Moreover, they rely on an assumption
of limited attacker computational power, while encrypted data may still provide information to attackers
(e.g., through traffic analysis). This motivated efforts to complement cryptographic techniques and fueled
interest in information-theoretic physical layer security [3].
The natural problem is to find the fundamental limits of performance measures, notably the secure rate
legitimate nodes can achieve, considering the overhead imposed by satisfying the secrecy constraints.
However, even in simple three- or four-node networks, the problem is open [4]; the complex nature of
large wireless networks with stochastic node distribution in space makes the derivation of exact results
intractable. This motivated the investigation of scaling laws, or the asymptotic behavior of the network,
to gain useful insights. The problem of finding scaling laws for large wireless networks with n randomly
located nodes was first investigated by Gupta and Kumar in [5]; they showed that multihopping schemes
can achieve at most an aggregate rate that scales like
√
n under an individual (per node) power constraint.
Using percolation theory, achievability of linear scaling was shown by Franceschetti et al. [6]. The main
characteristic of this line of works is the assumption of point-to-point communication, where each receiver
(not necessarily the final destination) is interested only in decoding the signal of a particular transmitter;
all other signals, roughly termed interference, are treated as noise. Therefore, these are mostly referred to
as interference-limited channel models. The broadcasting nature of wireless networks makes cooperation
easier, though it decreases the security level. Contrary to the interference-limited model, it has been
shown that cooperative schemes increase the aggregate rate to a near-linear scaling under individual
power constraints and achieve unbounded transport capacity for fixed total power in some cases (in [7],
[8] and follow-up works).
Recently, there is a growing interest in considering how secrecy constraints affect scaling laws of
large wireless networks [9]–[13]. To best of our knowledge, all these works considered point-to-point
interference-limited communications (multi-hopping) [9]–[13] to analyze the secrecy capacity scaling; no
active cooperative or relaying schemes were considered.
In this paper, contrary to the interference-limited models, we allow for arbitrary cooperation among
nodes and concentrate on the information-theoretic relaying schemes. With no secrecy constraint, Xie
and Kumar in [7] proposed a strategy of coherent multistage relaying to achieve unbounded transport
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3capacity for fixed total power in low-attenuation networks, i.e., achieving zero energy cost communication.
However, when seeking to address secrecy constraints, active cooperation (relaying) is a double-edged
sword: it benefits both legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers. Considering this trade-off, the fundamental
question is whether zero-cost secure communication is possible through active cooperation. We answer this
question positively here, filling this theoretical gap. Our result is further motivated by recent technological
developments for relaying-based schemes (e.g., massive deployment of relay nodes in LTE-Advanced
networks [14], [15]).
A. Background and Related Work
Physical layer security using information-theoretic tools leverages the channel statistics to thwart
eavesdroppers (attackers); depending on the channel conditions, a secure positive rate can be possible if
suitable coding schemes are employed. The information-theoretic notion of secrecy was introduced by
Shannon in [16], where he showed that in order to achieve perfect secrecy, i.e., zero information leakage,
one needs a secret key of size at least equal to the message size. This result inspired keyless information-
theoretic security in a noisy communication model called the wiretap channel. Wyner determined the
capacity of the degraded wiretap channel, with the channel to the eavesdropper being a degraded version
of the channel to the legitimate receiver [17]. The wiretap secrecy capacity achieving scheme, known also
as Wyner wiretap channel coding, comprises multicoding and randomized encoding [4, Section 22.1.1].
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner extended the secrecy capacity result to the the general wiretap channel (not necessarily
degraded) [18].
There has been considerable recent research interest in multi-user wiretap channels [19]–[26]. In these
channels, cooperation among legitimate users is possible in two different ways. First, through active
cooperation: legitimate nodes act as relays and cooperate with the source of the message in transmitting
its message to the destination. This scenario with a single relay was introduced in [23] as the relay-
eavesdropper channel where the secrecy rates were derived using relaying strategies such as the Decode-
and-Forward (DF) scheme [27]. The case of multiple relays was investigated in [25], [28]. Second,
passive cooperation, also known as deaf cooperation: the so called helper nodes transmit signals, which
are independent from the transmitted message of the legitimate transmitter, to confuse the eavesdroppers
and increase the secure rates [26], [28], [29]. In both cooperation modes, one can try to apply beamforming
at the helper nodes to improve the secrecy by constructing the virtual Multiple Input Multiple Output
(MIMO) scenarios and/or perform Zero-Forcing (ZF) at eavesdroppers [29]–[35]. It was shown that in
a high-SNR regime, the ZF transmit scheme is Diversity-Multiplexing Tradeoff (DMT) optimal in a
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4MIMO wiretap channel, with three nodes, a source, a destination and an eavesdropper [33], [34]. In this
paper, we concentrate on the active cooperation schemes based on information-theoretic secrecy coding
schemes.
The adversarial behavior in the aforementioned scenarios is captured by multiple eavesdroppers that
can either listen individually to the channel (non-colluding eavesdroppers) or they can share their ob-
servations and make the attack more effective (colluding eavesdroppers) [36]. The distinction of the
two adversarial models is significant. Collusion implies increased sophistication, thus more powerful
adversaries. In practice, it may be feasible for many systems. Thus, a non-colluding eavesdroppers model
may underestimate the adversary in some applications. In any case, it is an important question: How does
the increase in adversarial power (collusion) affect the secrecy rates and their scaling? The mitigation
of colluding eavesdroppers was investigated [9], [10], [36], [37].
Although there is considerable effort in these works on small networks (for both non-colluding and
colluding eavesdroppers), consisting of few nodes with deterministic locations, the problem of secure
communication in large networks received relatively less attention. Scaling laws for the secure aggregate
rate were derived for large wireless networks, only under the assumption of interference-limited channel.
Koyluoglu et al. [9] recently achieved a secure aggregate rate of scaling √n for a dense network of n
legitimate nodes, as long as the ratio of the densities of eavesdroppers and legitimate nodes scales as
(log n)−2, for non-colluding eavesdroppers. While for colluding eavesdroppers, the same rate scaling (i.e.,
√
n) is achieved for a lower density of eavesdroppers [9]. The authors in [11]–[13] considered extended
networks with unknown eavesdropper locations and achieved a secure rate of order 1. This result is
achieved through a deaf (passive) cooperative multi-hopping scheme in [13]. These scaling results were
achieved assuming that the transmission power for each node is fixed. Thus, the total power scales linearly
with the number of nodes, n, and the cost of secure communication (defined as the total power over the
secure rate) goes to ∞.
B. Our Contributions
Our work is the first that allows arbitrary cooperation among legitimate nodes in deriving scaling laws
for large wireless networks with secrecy constraints. Without the limitation of point-to-point communica-
tion, we show that cooperation can achieve unbounded secure rate with fixed total power, i.e., zero-cost
secure communication, as long as the number of the eavesdroppers is less than a derived threshold. We
consider a dense network, with a static path loss physical layer model and path loss exponent α ≥ 2, and
stochastic node placement. nl legitimate nodes and ne eavesdroppers are distributed according to Poisson
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5Point Processes (PPP) with intensities λl and λe, respectively, in a square of unit area. We consider the
fixed total power constraint and find two scaling results for nenl , where by satisfying these results one
can obtain infinite secure aggregate rate and thus zero-cost secure communication. Compared to [7], this
means that ne eavesdroppers can be tolerated asymptotically and do not affect the communication cost.
To achieve this result, we make use of (i) block Markov DF relaying, (ii) Wyner wiretap coding at
the source to secure the new part of the message transmitted in each block, and (iii) beamforming,
to secure the coherent parts transmitted cooperatively by all the nodes in the network. To apply DF,
we propose two types of schemes: parallel (two-stage) relaying and serial (multi-stage) relaying. For
beamforming, partial ZF at the eavesdroppers is used. DF based strategies for multiple relay networks
were proposed in [7], [38] and then they were extended to such networks with an eavesdropper in [25],
where some ZF schemes were applied. Here, we first extend these schemes to our network model with
stochastic distribution of legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers by deriving the conditions under which we
can apply the schemes. The main challenges we face are: the selection of relays among the legitimate
nodes, the priority and power allocation, and the choice of appropriate beamforming parameters. Once
these challenges addressed, we utilize the derived rates to achieve zero-cost secure communication.
Using the parallel (two-stage) relaying strategy, we show the possibility of achieving unbounded secure
aggregate rate as long as n
α
2
+1
e (log(ne))
γ+δ(α
2
+1) = o(nl) for some positive γ, δ holds. Our scheme has
two stages. First, the source of the message transmits to nr relay nodes within some distance. At the
second stage, the source and these relay nodes use block Markov coding [4] to cooperatively transmit the
message to the destination, while using ZF against the eavesdroppers. In fact, relay nodes can be seen as
a distributed virtual multi-antenna; using this diversity to combat the eavesdroppers. Transmissions are
pipelined and relay nodes operate in a full-duplex mode, a typical assumption (e.g., [7], [39]).
At the expense of additional complexity, we tolerate even more eavesdroppers with serial (multi-stage)
relaying. We achieve zero energy cost secure communication as long as n2e(log(ne))γ = o(nl) holds, for
some γ > 0. In this scheme, all network nodes can act as relays for the source node but they are ordered
in clusters and use block Markov coding and coherent transmission. Nodes in each cluster form a virtual
multi-antenna to apply ZF at the eavesdroppers.
Finally, we investigate how a more powerful adversary model (i.e., colluding eavesdroppers) degrades
the scaling of nenl for cooperative networks. We show that, even in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers,
active cooperation achieves zero-cost secure communication while tolerating less eavesdroppers (com-
pared to the non-colluding case). We let eavesdroppers exchange their channel outputs (observations),
i.e., collude, for free; this is the perfect collusion model considered in literature [9], [36]. We achieve an
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6unbounded secure rate given fixed total power (for the entire network), as long as n(2+
2
α
)
e (log ne)
γ = o(nl)
holds for some γ > 0. For the achievability, we propose a serial (multi-stage) relaying based scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the network model and notation.
Section III describes our proposed parallel relaying scheme and its scaling is derived. In Section IV, the
results of serial relaying scheme are stated. A number of remarks are provided in Section VI.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Notation: Upper-case letters (e.g., X) denote Random Variables (RVs) and lower-case letters (e.g.,
x) their realizations. The probability mass function (p.m.f) of a RV X with alphabet set X is denoted
by pX(x); occasionally subscript X is omitted. Anǫ (X,Y ) is the set of ǫ-strongly, jointly typical se-
quences of length n. Xji indicates a sequence of RVs (Xi,Xi+1, ...,Xj); we use Xj instead of X
j
1
for brevity. CN (0, σ2) denotes a zero-mean complex value Gaussian distribution with variance σ2. The
variables related to the legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers are indicated with sub/superscripts l and e,
respectively. ‖X‖p is the Lp-norm of a vector X; X(i) is its ith element. (·)T , (·)† and N (·) denote
the transpose, conjugate transpose and null space operations, respectively. For stating asymptotic results
(Landau notation), f(n) = o(g(n)) if lim
n→∞
f(n)
g(n) → 0.
Network and adversary model: We consider a dense wireless network, with channel gains obeying
a static path loss model, decaying exponentially as the distance between the (stochastically distributed)
nodes increases. This is consistent with models in prior works on capacity scaling laws [5]–[8] and
secrecy capacity scaling [9]. For the adversary model, we consider two cases: non-colluding and perfect
colluding passive eavesdroppers (as per all existing large network analyses modeling collusion [9], [36],
[37]). For brevity, in the rest of the paper, the eavesdroppers are non-colluding, unless it is stated otherwise
explicitly.
The network is a square of unit area where both the legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers are placed,
according to Poisson Point Processes (PPP) with intensities λl and λe, respectively, which is a suitable
assumption when nodes are independently and uniformly distributed in the network area or there is a
substantial mobility [40]. There is a set Nl of legitimate nodes and their number is nl = |Nl|. Similarly,
Ne and ne = |Ne| are the set of eavesdroppers and their number. As we consider large-scale networks,
throughout the paper, we implicitly assume that nl and ne go to ∞. Each legitimate node i ∈ Nl can be a
source of message mi ∈ Mi = [1 : 2ntRi ] and send it to its randomly chosen destination j ∈ Nl \ {i} in
nt channel uses. Every legitimate node i ∈ Nl operates in a full-duplex mode; at time slot t, it transmits
Xi(t) and receives Y li (t). The set of transmitting nodes at time slot t is denoted by T (t) ⊆ Nl. As we
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7consider passive attackers, each eavesdropper j ∈ Ne only observes the channel and at time slot t, it
receives Y ej (t). Therefore,
Y li (t)=
∑
k∈T (t)\{i}
hlk,i(t)Xk(t) + Z
l
i(t) (1)
Y ej (t)=
∑
k∈T (t)
hek,j(t)Xk(t) + Z
e
j (t) (2)
where, for any i ∈ Nl \ {k} and j ∈ Ne, the static path loss model channel gains are given by:
hlk,i(t) = (d
l
k,i)
−α/2 , hek,j(t) = (d
e
k,j)
−α/2 (3)
with dlk,i and dek,j denoting the distances between the transmitter Xk, k ∈ T (t) and the receiver Y li and
Y ej , respectively. Xk(t), k ∈ T (t), t ∈ [1 : nt] is an input signal and we consider the total power constraint
in the network:
1
nt
nt∑
t=1
∑
k∈T (t)
|xk(t)|2 ≤ P tot. (4)
Moreover, Z li(t) and Zei (t) are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) and zero mean circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian noise components with powers N l and N e, i.e., Z li ∼ CN (0, N l) and
Zei ∼ CN (0, N e), respectively. Our network model, defined above, is called Secure Network (SN )
throughout the paper.
To model collusion, in addition to observing the channel (Y ej (t) for j ∈ Ne at time slot t), the
eavesdroppers can exchange their observations for free (because of the perfect collusion assumption).
This means that all eavesdroppers have access to all the observations, shown by the vector Ye(t), with
Y ej (t) its j-th element. We term our network model in this case, SN with Perfect Colluding Eavesdroppers
(SN -PCE) throughout the rest of the paper.
Definition 1: LetR = [Ri : i ∈ Nl] be the rate vector and 2ntR .= {2ntRi : i ∈ Nl}. A (2ntR, nt, P (nt)e )
code for SN (or SN -PCE) consists of
(i) nl message sets Mi = [1 : 2ntRi ] for i ∈ Nl, where mi is uniformly distributed over Mi.
(ii) |T (t)| sets of randomized encoding functions at the transmitters: {fi,t}ntt=1 : Ct−1×Mi −→ C such
that xi,t = fi,t(mi, yt−1li ), for i ∈ T (t), 1 ≤ t ≤ nt and mi ∈ Mi.
(iii) Decoding functions, one at each legitimate node i ∈ Nl, gi : (Y li)nt × Mi 7→ Mk for some
k ∈ Nl \ {i}, where it is assumed that node i is the destination for the message of source k.
(iv) Probability of error for this code is defined as P (nt)e = max
i∈Nl
P
(nt)
e,i with:
P
(nt)
e,i =
1
2nt‖R‖1
∑
mk∈M
Pr(gi((Y
l
i )
nt ,mi) 6= mk|M sent) (5)
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8where M = {mi : i ∈ Nl}.
(v) For SN : The information leakage rate for eavesdropper j ∈ Ne is defined as
R
(nt)
L,j =
1
nt
I(M; (Y ej )
nt). (6)
For SN -PCE: The information leakage rate for the perfect colluding eavesdroppers set Ne is defined
as
R
(nt)
L =
1
nt
I(M; (Ye)nt). (7)
Definition 2: For SN : A rate-leakage vector (R,RL) is achievable if there exists a sequence of
(2ntR, nt, P
(nt)
e ) codes such that P (nt)e → 0 as nt → ∞ and lim sup
nt→∞
R
(nt)
L,j ≤ RL(j). The secrecy
capacity region, Cs, is the region which includes all achievable rate vectors, R, such that perfect secrecy
is achieved, i.e., RL = 0.
For SN -PCE: A rate vector-leakage pair (R, RL) is achievable if there exists a sequence of (2ntR, nt, P (nt)e )
codes such that P (nt)e → 0 as nt →∞ and lim sup
nt→∞
R
(nt)
L ≤ RL. The secrecy capacity region Cs includes
all achievable rate vectors, R, such that perfect secrecy is achieved, i.e., RL = 0.
In large-scale networks, it is intractable to consider the nl-dimensional secrecy capacity region; thus,
we focus on the secure aggregate rate, defined as:
Rs = sup
R∈Cs
‖R‖1. (8)
As we are interested in the achievability of Rs, without loss of generality, we assume that only one
source-destination pair is active and the other nodes assist their transmission. Therefore, we set |M| = 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that node 1 is the source node, i.e., M = {m1}: it transmits X1(t);
and Y l1 (t) = ∅. Thus, Rs = R1. We denote the destination of m1 by nl-th node: it receives Y lnl(t); and
Xnl(t) = ∅. This means that the transmitter X1 wishes to send message m1 ∈ M1 = [1 : 2ntR1 ] to the
receiver Y lnl with the help of nodes in Nl \ {1, nl}, while keeping it secret from the eavesdroppers in
Ne.
Remark 1: If a secure aggregate rate Rs = R1 is achievable in the above scenario (with uniformly
random matching of the source-destination pairs), any rate vector R with ‖R‖1 = Rs is also achievable
using a time-sharing scheme. For example, consider a network of n nodes with a total rate of 1 bit/sec. If
there is only one active source-destination pair, the source can transmit at the rate of 1 bit/sec. Otherwise,
a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) scheme, with n equal time slots, achieves the rate of 1n for
each (source) node in the network, with the total rate of n × 1n = 1 bit/sec. Any other rate allocation
with unit total rate is also attainable by using TDMA with non-equal time slots.
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9III. PARALLEL RELAYING
In this section, we consider a parallel (two-stage) relaying scheme and obtain the maximum number of
eavesdroppers that can be tolerated in a zero-cost secure communication. In fact, our main result of this
section, Theorem 2 shows that we achieve an unbounded secure aggregate rate for a fixed total power as
long as n
α
2
+1
e (log(ne))
γ+δ(α
2
+1) = o(nl), for some positive γ, δ. Our proof is derived in three steps:
1) First, we provide a lower bound on the secrecy capacity achieved through active cooperation,
randomized encoding and beamforming in Theorem 1. We propose a two-stage DF relaying and
design the appropriate codebook mapping that enables ZF at the eavesdroppers. To apply these
strategies, we derive conditions on the number and location of the relay nodes.
2) In the second step, the main challenge is to find strategies to apply the achievability scheme of the
first step to our network model (SN ). In Lemma 3, we obtain the constraints on the number of
legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers under which our network satisfies the conditions of the first step
and the achievability scheme can be applied.
3) In the last step, we apply the fixed total power constraint and show that the achievable secure aggre-
gate rate of the first step can be unbounded and derive the maximum number of the eavesdroppers
which can be tolerated in Theorem 2.
Step 1: As mentioned in Section II, the achievability relies on a single unicast scenario. Recall that a
lower bound on the secrecy capacity of this scenario is an achievable secure aggregate rate for SN . Here,
nr relay nodes (in Nl \ {1, nl}) are used as specified in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For SN , if there exists a set of transmitters
T =
{
1,
{
i
∣∣∣ |hl1,i|2 ≥ max{N
l
N e
|he1,j |2, |hl1,nl |2}
}} (9)
such that nr = |T | − 1 ≥ ne, the following secure aggregate rate is achievable :
RDF,ZF,pars = max
B,P˜1,P˜u
min
j∈Ne
min{log(N
e
N l
N l + |hl1,i∗ |2P˜1
N e + |he1,j |2P˜1
),
log(
N e
N l
N l + |hl1,nl |2P˜1 + |
∑
k∈T
hlk,nlβk|2P˜u
N e + |he1,j |2P˜1
)} (10)
where
i∗ = argmin
i∈T \{1}
|h1,i| (11)
βk = B(k) where B ∈ N (HNe,T ) (12)
P˜1 + ‖B‖22P˜u ≤ P tot (13)
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in which HNe,T ∈ Cne×(nr+1) is the transmitters-eavesdroppers channel matrix whose (j, i)-th element
is hei,j for i ∈ T , j ∈ Ne.
Proof: First, we outline the coding strategy, based on a two-stage block Markov coding, i.e., all relays
have the same priority for the source. In each block, the source sends the fresh message to all nr relay
nodes and uses Wyner wiretap coding to keep this part of the message secret from the eavesdroppers.
At the same time, the source and the relays cooperate in sending the message of the previous block by
coherently transmitting the related codeword. This coherent transmission enables them to use ZF against
the eavesdroppers, by properly designed beamforming coefficients. As the cooperative codewords of the
relays are fully zero-forced at all eavesdroppers, no Wyner wiretap coding is needed at the relays.
Now, to apply this coding strategy, first we provide achievable rate RDM,pars based on two-stage block
Markov coding (parallel DF relaying) and Wyner wiretap coding for the general discrete memoryless
channel in Lemma 1 (proof is provided in Appendix A). Then, we extendRDM,pars to the Gaussian channel
in Lemma 2 and derive RDF,pars (proof in Appendix B). Finally, we apply ZF on RDF,pars to achieve the
desired result, i.e., RDF,ZF,pars . For simplicity in notation, let Nl = {1, . . . , nl}, T = {1, . . . , nr + 1}
and Ne = {1, . . . , ne}.
Lemma 1: For the general discrete memoryless counterpart of SN , given by some conditional distri-
bution p(yl2, . . . , ylnl , y
e
1 . . . , y
e
ne |x1, . . . , xnl), the secrecy capacity is lower-bounded by:
RDM,pars = sup min
j∈Ne
{min{ min
i∈T \{1}
I(U1;Y
l
i |U), I(U,U1;Y lnl)} − I(U,U1;Y ej )} (14)
where the supremum is taken over all joint p.m.fs of the form
p(u, u1)p(x1, . . . , xnr+1|u, u1). (15)
Now, we extend the above lemma to accommodate our model (SN ). Even for a simple channel with
one relay and one eavesdropper, the optimal selection of the RVs in Lemma 1 (i.e., finding the optimal
p.m.f of (15)) is an open problem [25]. Hence, we propose an appropriate suboptimal choice of input
distribution, using Gaussian RVs, to achieve the following rate.
Lemma 2: The following secure aggregate rate is achievable for SN :
RDF,pars = max
B,P˜1,P˜u
min
j∈Ne
{
min{ min
i∈[2:nr+1]
log(1 +
|hl1,i|2P˜1
N l
), log(1 +
|hl1,nl |2P˜1 + |
nr+1∑
k=1
hlk,nlβk|2P˜u
N l
)}
− log(1 +
|he1,j |2P˜1 + |
nr+1∑
k=1
hek,jβk|2P˜u
N e
)
} (16)
where βk = B(k) and P˜1 + ‖B‖22P˜u ≤ P tot.
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It can easily be seen from (16) that to have a positive secrecy rate the source-relay links should be
stronger than the source-eavesdropper links. Moreover, for the DF strategy to be better than point-to-point
transmission the source-relay links should be stronger than the direct source-destination link. Therefore,
these two conditions “select” the nr relay nodes in the DF strategy and, hence, the set of transmitters
T (t) given by (9). Moreover, the condition in (11) is obtained by considering the inner min in (16).
Returning to (16), one should determine the beamforming coefficient vector B. Finding the closed
form solution is an open problem [28]. Thus, we consider a suboptimal strategy by applying ZF at all
eavesdroppers and obtain
HNe,TB = 0 (17)
where HNe,T is defined in Theorem 1. Hence, the coefficient vector B must lie in the null space of
HNe,T , as stated in (12). By applying (17) to (16), we achieve (10).
In order to ensure that there exists a non-trivial solution B for (17), the dimension of N (HNe,T )
should be greater than zero or rank(HNe,T ) ≤ nr. Considering the worst-case scenario when HNe,T is
a full rank matrix, the ZF strategy requires ne ≤ nr. This condition is implied by the cardinality of the
set of transmitters in (9). This means that to combat eavesdroppers, one needs at least the same number
of nodes as relays in this scheme. Observing that the total power constraint (13) is already obtained in
Lemma 2 completes the proof.
Step 2: We start by choosing two random nodes in the network as our source-destination pair. Recall
that nl, ne →∞. By applying Lemma 8 (stated in Appendix C), nl and ne can be made arbitrarily close
to λl and λe, respectively, with high probability (w.h.p). We define the relaying square Sr of side dr,
with the source at its center, as well as the eavesdropper-free square Se of side de (illustrated in Fig. 1)
such that:
dr =
√
nr
nl
, de =
√
nr
nl
(log ne)
γ
2 for some γ > 0. (18)
The next lemma shows the feasibility of these squares.
Lemma 3: As long as nl ≥ nenr(log ne)γ+δ for some γ, δ > 0, the probability of having at least nr
legitimate nodes in Sr tends to 1, and the probability of having the eavesdropper-free square Se can be
made arbitrarily close to 1.
Proof: Using the fact that a Poisson process has Poisson increments, the number of nodes in Sr is a
two-dimensional Poisson RV with parameter λld2r , at least equals to nr w.h.p (by applying (18) and (42))
as long as λld2r ≃ nr →∞. This always holds because nr ≥ ne. Similarly, the number of eavesdroppers
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Equals 
to 0 
by ZF
Fig. 1. Parallel relaying illustrated for a typical network model, a square of unit area; with 500 legitimate nodes and 20
eavesdroppers, placed according to PPP. The relaying square Sr of side dr is shown with solid line and the eavesdropper-free
square Se of side de is shown with dashed line. The source (with channel input X1) is at the center of Sr and Se. We choose
T as nr + 1 nodes in Sr. The destination node is shown with channel output Y lnl . For brevity, ZF is only shown (solid lines
originating Sr) in one eavesdropper.
in Se is a Poisson RV with parameter λed2e ≃ nenrnl (log ne)γ , which converges to 0 by applying the
condition stated in this lemma. Hence, the probability of having no eavesdropper in Se, i.e., e−λed
2
e , can
be made arbitrarily close to 1.
Step 3: Note that the number of relays, specified in the above lemma as nlne(log ne)γ+δ , should not be less
than ne. Now, we state the main result of this section and prove that the scaling of the nodes satisfies
this constraint.
Theorem 2: In SN with fixed P tot in (4), as long as n
α
2
+1
e (log(ne))
γ+δ(α
2
+1) = o(nl) holds for some
positive γ, δ, w.h.p. an infinite secure aggregate rate Rs is achievable.
Proof: First, we randomly choose the source of the message and call it node 1. According to
Lemma 3, squares Sr and Se with sides defined in (18) exist w.h.p, with the source at their center. We
randomly choose the destination and call it node nl. If the destination is inside Sr, then the message is sent
directly and no cooperation is needed. The model reduces to a wiretap channel with many eavesdroppers;
the following rate, using Wyner wiretap coding at the source, is achievable:
RWTs =min
j∈Ne
log(
N e
N l
N l + |hl1,nl |2P˜1
N e + |he1,j |2P˜1
) (19)
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(a)
≥ log(N
e
N l
N l + d−αr P tot
N e + (de2 )
−αP tot
) log(
de
dr
)α
(b)→∞ as nl →∞
where (a) is obtained by considering (3), the definitions of Sr and Se and by applying (4), and (b) holds
due to (18). Otherwise, if the destination node is not in Sr, Lemma 3 implies that w.h.p. we can construct
the set of transmitters in (9). Now, to make ZF possible we must show that nr = |T | − 1 ≥ ne. By
applying the constraint of Lemma 3 with equality, we have
nr =
nl
ne(log ne)γ+δ
(a)
= n
α
2
e (log(ne))
α
2
δ nl
o(nl)
(b)
≥ ne
(a) is due to the scaling condition stated in this theorem and (b) is obtained because α ≥ 2. Now, we
can use the strategy of Theorem 1 to achieve (10). To apply the total power constraint (13), in this case,
we choose a fixed P˜1 = P 1 and set P˜u = P tot−P 1‖B‖22 . First, we consider the first term in (10), known
as broadcast term (the secure rate from the source to nr relay nodes in Sr), and derive its asymptotic
behavior as
log(
N e
N l
N l + |hl1,i∗ |2P˜1
N e + |he1,j |2P˜1
)
(a)
≥ log(N
e
N l
N l + d−αr P 1
N e + (de2 )
−αP 1
)
=log(
de
dr
)α
(b)→∞ as nl →∞ (20)
where (a) is obtained by considering (3) and the defined squares, and (b) is due to (18). As expected, the
rate to each node in Sr is similar to the case where the destination is also in Sr; it can be made arbitrary
large by decreasing the size of Sr as needed. Note that this decrease needs larger λl to have nr ≥ ne
legitimate nodes in Sr to employ them as relays. Before continuing to the second term in (10), we take
a closer look at the beamforming vector B ∈ N (HNe,T ). By applying Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD), we have
HNe,T = UΛ[ΥV]
T ;
Υ ∈ C(nr+1)×ne contains the first ne right singular vectors corresponding to non-zero singular values,
and V ∈ C(nr+1)×(nr−ne+1) contains the last nr−ne+1 singular vectors corresponding to zero singular
values of HNe,T . The later forms an orthonormal basis for the null space of HNe,T . Hence, B can be
expressed as their linear combination, i.e.,
B = VΦ
where Φ ∈ C(nr−ne+1) is an arbitrary vector selected by considering the power constraints in (13). Now,
we consider the second term of (10), known as the multi-access term. This corresponds to the cooperative
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secure rate from the source and the nr relays toward the destination.
max
B
log(
N e
N l
N l + |hl1,nl |2P˜1 + |
∑
k∈T
hlk,nlβk|2P˜u
N e + |he1,j |2P˜1
)
(a)
≥ max
B
log(
2α/4N e
N l
|1†B|2 · P tot−P 1‖B‖22
N e + (de2 )
−αP 1
)
= max
Φ†Φ≤‖B‖22
log(
2α/4N e
N l
Φ†V†11†VΦ · P tot−P 1‖B‖22
N e + (de2 )
−αP 1
)
= log(
2α/4N e
N l
λmax(V
†11†V) · (P tot − P 1)
N e + (de2 )
−αP 1
)
= log(
2α/4N e
N l
‖1†V‖22 · (P tot − P 1)
N e + (de2 )
−αP 1
)
(b)
= log(
2α/4N e
N l
(nr + 1)
1+cos 2θ
2 · (P tot − P 1)
N e + (de2 )
−αP 1
)
(c)
=
nl→∞
log(κ
(nr + 1)
d−αe
)
(d)→∞ as nl →∞ (21)
(a) holds since dlk,nl ≤
√
2 and 1 ∈ C(nr+1) is the all one vector. In (b), θ is an RV denotes the angle
between 1 and N (HNe,T ) and has a continuous distribution on [0, 2π] due to the randomness of HNe,T .
In (c), κ is a constant. (d) is obtained by substituting (18) and nr = nlne(logne)γ+δ and by applying the
scaling n
α
2
+1
e (log(ne))
γ+δ(α
2
+1) = o(nl) for some positive γ, δ. This completes the proof.
IV. SERIAL RELAYING
In this section, we improve the scaling of the number of eavesdroppers we can defend against at the
expense of a more complicated strategy, serial (multi-stage) relaying. The network is divided into clusters,
with the nodes in each cluster acting as a group of relays and, at the same time, collectively applying ZF
(essentially acting as a distributed multi-antenna). These clusters perform ordered DF: the nodes in each
cluster decode the transmitted signals of all previous clusters. We use the three-step approach outlined
in Section III to obtain our result here. We show that unbounded secure aggregate rate for a fixed total
power can be achieved as long as n2e(log(ne))γ = o(nl) holds for some positive γ.
Step 1: Achievability is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: For SN , the following secure aggregate rate is achievable:
RDF,ZF,sers = min
i∈[1:nl−1]
max
Bi,P˜i
min
j∈Ne
log(
N e
N l
N l +
i∑
q=1
|
q∑
k=1
hlk,i+1β
′
kq|2P˜q
N e + |he1,j |2P˜1
) (22)
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in which
β′kq = Bq(k) and β′kq = 1 if k = q (23)
Bq ∈ N (HNe,T q) for q mod ne = 1 (24)
P˜q =


P q if q mod ne = 1
0 if q mod ne 6= 1
(25)
nl−1∑
q=1
‖Bq‖22P˜q ≤ P tot (26)
where HNe,T q ∈ Cne×q is the cluster-eavesdroppers channel matrix which its (j, i)th element is hei,j for
i ∈ [1 : q], j ∈ Ne.
Proof: We use a (nl − 1)-stage block Markov coding by making the nodes relaying the message
with ordered priorities. Considering the ordered set for the legitimate nodes, i.e., Nl = {1, . . . , nl}, each
node i decodes the transmitted signal of all previous nodes (1 to i− 1) in this order and sends its signal
to the subsequent nodes. In order to pipeline communication, (nl − 1)th order block Markov correlated
codes are proposed. Therefore, in each block, the received signals at the legitimate nodes are coherent
[39]. To apply ZF at the eavesdroppers, we show it is necessary to have clusters of enough relays, where
the nodes in each cluster have the same priority compared to the source. Wyner wiretap coding is also
utilized at the source. First, we use the multi-stage block Markov coding (serial DF relaying) and Wyner
wiretap coding to obtain RDM,sers in Lemma 4 (proof provided in Appendix D) and extend it to RDF,sers
for the Gaussian channel in Lemma 5 (proof in Appendix E). Then, by applying ZF on RDF,sers we
derive RDF,ZF,sers .
Lemma 4: Consider the channel model of Lemma 1 and let π(·) be a permutation on Nl = {1, . . . , nl},
where π(1) = 1, π(nl) = nl and π(m : n) = {π(m), π(m+1), . . . , π(n)}. The secrecy capacity is lower-
bounded by:
RDM,sers = sup min
j∈Ne
max
π(·)
min
i∈[1:nl−1]
I(Uπ(1:i);Y
l
π(i+1)|Uπ(i+1:nl−1))− I(Uπ(1:nl−1);Y ej )
where the supremum is taken over all joint p.m.fs of the form
p(u1, . . . , unl−1)
nl−1∏
k=1
p(xk|uk). (27)
Similar to the parallel relaying case, we choose an appropriate suboptimal input distribution in the
following lemma.
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Lemma 5: For SN , the following is an achievable secure aggregate rate:
RDF,sers = min
i∈[1:nl−1]
max
Bi,P˜i
min
j∈Ne
log(1 +
i∑
q=1
|
q∑
k=1
hlk,i+1β
′
kq|2P˜q
N l
)− log(1 +
nl−1∑
q=1
|
q∑
k=1
hek,jβ
′
kq|2P˜q
N e
)(28)
where (23) and (26) hold.
For the serial relaying scheme, as the achievable rate is not limited by the decoding constraint at the
farthest relay, all nodes in the network (except the source and destination) can be used as the relay nodes.
Therefore, the transmission set can be T = {1, . . . , nl − 1} where the relays are assumed to be in a
certain order, e.g., based on their distances to the source node. Similar to Section III, we apply ZF at all
eavesdroppers to determine the beamforming coefficient vectors Bq by setting
nl−1∑
q=2
|
q∑
k=1
hek,jβ
′
kq|2P˜q =
0,∀j ∈ Ne. This results in P˜q = 0 or
E(q, j) =
q∑
k=1
hek,jβ
′
kq = 0,
for ∀q ∈ [2 : nl − 1]. Now consider (45) to obtain Xk = U˜k + βkXk+1 where β′kq =
q−1∏
m=k
βm. Therefore,
E(q0, j) and E(q0+1, j) only differ in one variable, i.e., βq0+1. However, we need E(q, j) = 0,∀j ∈ Ne
if P˜q > 0, which is clearly not possible. Therefore, we apply ZF by allocating power as per (25) and
E(q, j) = 0, if q mod ne = 1,∀j ∈ Ne. Thus, we obtain HNe,T qBq = 0 shown in (24) (HNe,T q is
defined in Theorem 3). By applying (24) on (28), we achieve (22). This means that to overcome ne
eavesdroppers using the proposed strategy, one node in every ne legitimate nodes should transmit fresh
information and the ne nodes who transmit the same information in each block should apply beamforming
to ZF at all eavesdroppers.
Step 2: Consider Fig. 2 and assume cmax clusters (squares) Sc of same side dc; the source is located
in the first and the destination in the last cluster; any two successive clusters share one side. Hence, we
have 1dc ≤ cmax ≤ 2dc . We show cmax does not affect the asymptotic behavior of Rs. Assuming the
strategy of Step 1, all the nodes in each cluster Sc transmit the same fresh information. Now, consider
an eavesdropper-free square Se of side de around the source. We define
dc =
√
nc
nl
, de =
√
nc
nl
(log ne)
γ
2 for some γ > 0 (29)
where nc is determined in Lemma 6 which shows the feasibility of these squares and can be proved
similar to Lemma 3.
Lemma 6: As long as nenc(log ne)γ = o(nl) for some γ > 0, the probability of having at least
nc →∞ legitimate nodes in Sr tends to 1, and the probability of having no eavesdropper in square Se
can be made arbitrarily close to 1.
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Fig. 2. Clusters (squares Sc, thin solid line) of side dc used for serial relaying. The nodes in each cluster, c, coherently with
nodes in all previous clusters and i − c subsequent clusters send P˜ine+1 to the nodes in cluster i + 1 for i ≥ c. Each dotted
arrow shows the received signals at one eavesdropper from all nodes in each cluster; these are equal to zero thanks to ZF.
We remark that to apply ZF at all eavesdroppers, the number of nodes in each cluster, i.e., nc, should
not be less than ne.
Step 3: Now, we state the main result of this section.
Theorem 4: In SN with fixed total power P tot in (4), as long as n2e(log ne)γ = o(nl) holds for some
positive γ, w.h.p. an infinite secure aggregate rate Rs is achievable.
Proof: Choosing the source and the destination is same as proof of Theorem 2. If the destination
is inside the square Sc, the message is sent directly to it using Wyner wiretap coding at the source.
Similar to (19), since dedc → ∞ as nl → ∞, in this case an unbounded rate is achievable. Otherwise
(the destination is outside Sc), we choose nc = ne + 1 and consider cmax clusters as described in the
previous step. Substituting nc = ne + 1 into the scaling of Lemma 6 results in scaling of this theorem.
As nc ≥ ne, w.h.p ZF can be applied and the rate of Theorem 3 is achievable. If we consider equal
power allocation for the fresh information in the total power constraint (26), we obtain
P˜q =
P tot
cmax∑
c=0
‖Bcne+1‖22
= P q = P ,
if q mod ne = 1 and q ≤ cmaxne + 1. Otherwise (q mod ne 6= 1), P˜q = 0. Note that we consider an
ordered set of legitimate nodes based on the cluster numbers, which can be done w.h.p according to
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Lemma 6. Now, we show that (22) can be unbounded w.h.p for all i ∈ [1 : nl − 1], j ∈ Ne and Bqs that
satisfy (23) and (24). First, we consider i ≤ ne + 1 that comprises the nodes in the first cluster:
RDF,ZF,sers
(a)
=log(
N e
N l
N l + |hlk,i+1|2P 1
N e + |he1,j |2P 1
) (30)
(b)
≥ log(N
e
N l
N l + d−αc P 1
N e + d−αe P 1
)→∞ as nl →∞
where (a) is due to (25) and (b) is obtained by considering (3) and the defined squares in (29). This rate
is similar to the one we have in (20). In fact, one expects that this rate can be made arbitrary large if we
choose Sc small enough (by increasing the density of nodes). In parallel relaying, the problem with the
second term in (10) is the fixed non-decreasing distance between the nodes in Sr and the destination. We
here overcome this problem by considering clusters such that the maximum distance between the nodes
in two adjacent clusters is √5dc. Therefore, for the nodes in cluster c, i.e., cne + 1 ≤ i ≤ (c+ 1)ne, we
set q = cne + 1:
RDF,ZF,sers ≥ log(
N e
N l
N l + |
q∑
k=1
hlk,i+1β
′
kq|2P˜q
N e + |he1,j |2P˜1
)
(a)
= log(
N e
N l
N l + |hTq Bq|2P
N e + |he1,j |2P
)
(b)
≥
nl→∞
log(
de
dc
)α
(c)→∞ as nl →∞ (31)
(a) is obtained by defining hq = [hl1,i+1, . . . , hlq,i+1]T . (b) follows from the steps similar to (21) and from
noting that ‖Bq‖22 ≥ Bq(q) = β′qq = 1, ‖hq‖22 ≥ |hlq,i+1|2 ≥ d−αc and the randomness of HNe,T q . (c) is
due to (29). This completes the proof.
V. COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
In this section, we state the maximum number of perfect-colluding eavesdroppers that can be tol-
erated in a zero-cost secure communication using a relaying based scheme. In fact, we show that if
n
(2+ 2
α
)
e (log ne)
γ = o(nl) holds for some positive γ, we achieve an unbounded secure aggregate rate for
a fixed total power. For the proof, we adapt the framework of Section IV to the colluding case, where
in each step, the collusion should be taken into consideration.
1) A lower bound to the secrecy capacity: We propose an achievability scheme in Theorem 5 for a
multiple relay channel in presence of perfect colluding eavesdroppers.
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2) Fitting the achievability scheme of Step 1 to SN -PCE: By choosing appropriate values for the
parameters of the first step, the constraints on the number of legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers are
derived in Lemma 7, under which the achievability results of Theorem 5 can be applied to SN -PCE.
3) Infinite secure aggregate rate: We show that the achievable secure aggregate rate of the first step is
unbounded after applying the fixed total power constraint (in Theorem 6). Hence, the maximum number
of the tolerable perfect colluding eavesdroppers is obtained.
Step 1: The following theorem presents an achievable secure rate for a multiple relay channel in the
presence of colluding eavesdroppers. We use serial (multi-stage) active cooperation (relaying), randomized
encoding and beamforming through ZF. To make the ZF possible, we divide the network into clusters,
where the nodes in each cluster act as a group of relays and, at the same time, collectively apply ZF
(essentially as a distributed multi-antenna) on the colluding eavesdroppers. Applying this strategy results
in some conditions on the clustering (such as the number of the nodes in each cluster). The proof is
provided in Appendix F.
Theorem 5: For SN -PCE, the following secure aggregate rate is achievable:
RZFs = min
i∈[1:nl−1]
max
Bi,P˜i
log(
N e
N l
N l +
i∑
q=1
|
q∑
k=1
hlk,i+1β
′
kq|2P˜q
N e +
∑
j∈Ne
|he1,j |2P˜1
) (32)
in which
β′kq = Bq(k) and β′kq = 1 if k = q (33)
Bq ∈ N (HNe,T q) for q mod ne = 1 (34)
P˜q =


P q if q mod ne = 1
0 if q mod ne 6= 1
(35)
nl−1∑
q=1
‖Bq‖22P˜q ≤ P tot (36)
where HNe,T q ∈ Cne×q is the cluster-eavesdroppers channel matrix; its (j, i)th element is hei,j , for
i ∈ [1 : q], j ∈ Ne.
Step 2: Now, we specify the details of our strategy and derive the constraints on the number of
legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers in Lemma 7 (to apply the scheme of Theorem 5 to SN -PCE). First,
we choose randomly the source-destination pair in Nl. Since nl, ne →∞, we can apply Lemma 8 (stated
in Appendix C) to make nl and ne arbitrarily close to λl and λe, respectively, with high probability
(w.h.p). We design cmax clusters (squares), Sc, of same side dc (as shown in Fig. 3); we consider an
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Fig. 3. The squares are same as the ones in Fig. 2. Here, the dashed lines (only shown for one eavesdropper) show the free
access of the eavesdroppers to all observations.
ordered set of nodes in clusters, with the source in the first cluster and the destination in the last one;
any two successive clusters share one side. This results in 1dc ≤ cmax ≤ 2dc . In fact, the following results
show that the asymptotic behavior of Rs is independent of cmax. Adapting the strategy of Step 1, each
cluster (Sc) consists of the nodes transmitting the same part of the fresh information: in each cluster,
only one node transmits fresh information. We only need one eavesdropper-free square, Se, of side de
around the source (the remaining communications are secured through beamforming). We define:
dc =
√
nc
nl
, de = n
1
α
e
√
nc
nl
(log ne)
γ
2 for some γ > 0 (37)
where nc is given in the following lemma that shows the feasibility of designing these squares.
Lemma 7: If ncn
(1+ 2
α
)
e (log ne)
γ = o(nl) holds for some γ > 0, the probability of having at least
nc → ∞ legitimate nodes in Sc goes to 1, and the probability of having no eavesdropper in square Se
approaches 1.
Proof: Using the fact that a Poisson process has Poisson increments, the number of nodes in Sc
is a two-dimensional Poisson RV with parameter λld2c . As long as λld2c ≃ nc → ∞ holds, we can
apply Lemma 8 (stated in Appendix C) on (37) to show that this number is greater than nc w.h.p.
Recall that to apply ZF at all eavesdroppers, we need at least ne nodes in each cluster, i.e., nc ≥ ne.
Thus, the above condition already holds (nc ≥ ne → ∞). The number of eavesdroppers in Se is also
a Poisson RV. Considering (37) and the condition stated in this lemma, we derive the parameter of this
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RV as: λed2e ≃ ncn
(1+ 2
α
)
e
nl
(log ne)
γ → 0. Now, the probability of having no eavesdropper in Se equals to
e−λed
2
e → 1. This completes the proof.
Step 3: Now, we state our main result of this section.
Theorem 6: Considering the fixed total power (P tot) constraint in (4) for SN -PCE, an infinite secure
aggregate rate Rs is achievable (w.h.p.), as long as n(2+
2
α
)
e (log ne)
γ = o(nl) holds for some positive γ.
Proof: Randomly choose the source-destination pair; let the source be node 1 and the destination
node nl; design the squares Sc and Se as per (37) (around the source), which exist w.h.p due to Lemma 7.
Moreover, design the clusters with an ordered set of legitimate nodes (based on the cluster numbers),
which is feasible w.h.p according to Lemma 7. Consider the following cases:
Case 1: the destination is inside the first cluster (Sc). The source directly sends its message to the
destination without any cooperation. In fact, all other nodes are silent. Therefore, the network reduces
to a wiretap channel with many perfect colluding eavesdroppers. We use Wyner wiretap coding at the
source to achieve the following unbounded rate:
RWTs =log(
N e
N l
N l + |hl1,nl |2P˜1
N e +
∑
j∈Ne
|he1,j |2P˜1
) (38)
(a)
≥ log(N
e
N l
N l + d−αc P tot
N e + ne(
de
2 )
−αP tot
)
(b)→∞ as nl →∞
where (a) follows from (3) and (4) (by considering the concepts of Sc and Se squares); (b) follows from
(37).
Case 2: the destination is outside the first cluster (Sc). Now, design the previously described cmax
clusters each with nc = ne+1 nodes. By substituting nc = ne+1 into the scaling of Lemma 7, one can
obtain n(2+
2
α
)
e (log ne)
γ = o(nl), i.e., the scaling of this theorem. As nc ≥ ne, w.h.p, ZF can be applied
and we achieve the rate of Theorem 5. Now, we allocate the power equally to the fresh information based
on the total power constraint (36). Thus, we have P˜q = P totcmax∑
c=0
‖Bcne+1‖
2
2
= P q = P , if q mod ne = 1 and
q ≤ cmaxne + 1. Otherwise, if q mod ne 6= 1), we set P˜q = 0. Thus, we can substitute these allocations
into (32) and investigate its asymptotic behavior for all i ∈ [1 : nl − 1] and Bqs that satisfy (33) and
(34). First, we consider the nodes in the first cluster by letting i ≤ ne + 1:
RZFs
(a)
=log(
N e
N l
N l + |hlk,i+1|2P 1
N e +
∑
j∈Ne
|he1,j |2P 1
) (39)
(b)
≥ log(N
e
N l
N l + d−αc P 1
N e + ned
−α
e P 1
)→∞ as nl →∞
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(a) follows from the power allocation as in (35). (b) follows from the network model in (3) and the
clustering (squares) concept with the sizes as per (37). The intuition is to make the cluster Sc small
enough to increase the rate achievable toward the nodes in the first cluster (similar to Case 1). However,
by this reduction in the cluster size, one needs larger λl to have enough nodes in each cluster to make
ZF possible at all eavesdroppers (i.e., nc ≥ ne). This trade-off specifies the scaling.
Now, before continuing to the rate of the other clusters, let us take a closer look at the beamforming
vector of each cluster (Bq ∈ N (HNe,T q) for q mod ne = 1). By applying Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD), we have HNe,T q = UqΛq[ΥqVq]T ; Υq ∈ Cq×ne contains the first ne right singular vectors
corresponding to non-zero singular values, and Vq ∈ Cq×(q−ne) contains the last q−ne singular vectors
corresponding to zero singular values of HNe,T q . The later forms an orthonormal basis for the null
space of HNe,T q . Hence, Bq can be expressed as their linear combination, i.e., Bq = VqΦq, where
Φq ∈ C(q−ne) is an arbitrary vector selected by considering the power constraints in (36).
Now, consider the nodes in cluster c, i.e., cne+1 ≤ i ≤ (c+1)ne, and set q = cne+1. We remark that
to overcome the fixed, non-decreasing distance between the nodes in the first cluster and the destination,
the clusters are designed such that the maximum distance between the nodes in two adjacent clusters is
√
5dc.
RZFs = max
Bi
log(
N e
N l
N l + |
q∑
k=1
hlk,i+1β
′
kq|2P˜q
N e +
∑
j∈Ne
|he1,j |2P˜1
)
(a)
= max
Bq
log(
N e
N l
N l + |h†qBq|2P
N e +
∑
j∈Ne
|he1,j |2P
)
= max
Φq†Φq≤‖Bq‖22
log(
N e
N l
N l +Φ†qV
†
qhqh
†
qVqΦqP
N e +
∑
j∈Ne
|he1,j |2P
)
= log(
N e
N l
N l + ‖Bq‖22λmax(V†qhqh†qVq)P
N e +
∑
j∈Ne
|he1,j |2P
)
= log(
N e
N l
N l + ‖Bq‖22‖h†qVq‖22P
N e +
∑
j∈Ne
|he1,j |2P
)
(b)
≥
nl→∞
log
1
ne
(
de
dc
)α
(c)→∞ as nl →∞ (40)
(a) is obtained by defining hq = [hl1,i+1, . . . , hlq,i+1]T . (b) follows from ‖Bq‖22 ≥ Bq(q) = β′qq = 1,
‖hq‖22 ≥ |hlq,i+1|2 ≥ d−αc , ‖Vq‖22 = 1 and the randomness of HNe,T q and hq. (c) is due to (37). This
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TABLE I
Non-colluding Colluding
Interference-limited [9], Cs →∞ nenl = o((log nl)
−2) ne
nl
= O((log nl)
−2−ρ), ρ > 0
Cooperative, Cs → 0 Theorem 4: n2e(log ne)γ = o(nl) Theorem 6: n
(2+ 2
α
)
e (log ne)
γ = o(nl), γ > 0
completes the proof.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Comparison to existing results: In general, we can define the cost of secure communication as
Cs =
P tot
Rs
. In prior works [9]–[13], due to the individual power constraint (the transmission power for
each node is fixed), P tot scales linearly with the number of nodes. Therefore, the scaling for the cost
of secure communication lies in [
√
n, n] and Cs → ∞ as n → ∞. Here, we showed that cooperation
based schemes can achieve secure communication with cost that goes to 0 as the number of nodes goes
to ∞. This is so because we use a fixed P tot. Table I compares our scaling result to the existing ones,
for both colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers. It can be seen that in both interference-limited and
cooperative network models, the same secure communication cost can be achieved, by tolerating a slightly
lower number of eavesdroppers for the colluding case (compared to the non-colluding case). However,
in the cooperative model, this degradation depends on the path loss exponent, α > 2, and it improves as
α increases. Moreover, the scaling of Theorem 4 can be written as nenl = o((ne(log ne)
γ)−1) ≃ o(n−1e ).
To compare the scalings, one must compare (log nl)2 (for result of [9]) with ne (for our result), which
seem to have the same order. For example, ne = log nl satisfies both scalings.
Zero cost communication with no secrecy constraint was achieved in [7]. Note that our strategy tolerates
ne eavesdroppers satisfying the constraints in Table I. Hence, compared to [7], this means that this number
of eavesdroppers does not affect the scaling of communication cost.
Parallel vs. serial relaying: Apart from the difference in the derived scaling for the number of tolerated
eavesdroppers, our two schemes differ in terms of the individual power allocation. The parallel relaying
scheme uses fewer relay nodes than the serial scheme. Hence, a larger fraction of P tot is allocated per
node. Therefore, serial relaying may be suitable for power-limited applications, with strict per node power
constraints. For both schemes, the per node allocated power vanishes as the number of nodes increases
but with different asymptotic behavior.
Channel State Information (CSI): In our network model (SN and SN -PCE, notably (3)), CSI is
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equivalent to node location information. CSI for legitimate nodes can be obtained in practice (e.g., pilot
symbols, feedback). The challenge is to obtain the eavesdroppers’ CSI. We assume global CSI is available,
a common assumption in most of the physical layer security schemes (e.g., [25], [26]). DF relaying can
be applied without the eavesdroppers’ CSI as it only needs the location of the closest eavesdropper.
However, to design the beamforming coefficients for ZF, full CSI is necessary. Due to the complexity
of the problem, this idealistic assumption allows to gain valuable insights. Obviously, the next step we
consider as a future work is to investigate the problem when less or no eavesdroppers’ CSI is available.
Less CSI means knowledge of the eavesdroppers’ channel statistics or imperfect estimates. In practice,
these assumptions are appropriate in some scenarios, e.g., public safety, where some areas are less likely
to have eavesdroppers. For imperfect CSI estimation, the authors in [28] showed that the achievable
secrecy rate depends on the estimation error covariance matrix. Moreover, [41] concludes that to achieve
secure rate in wireless networks one needs little CSI. We contrast our result of achieving infinite rate
with known eavesdropper CSI/location, to the results for the interference-limited channel model: if the
location of eavesdroppers is unknown [11]–[13], the achievable rate is of order 1.
Perfect versus constrained collusion: We assumed perfect colluding eavesdroppers, considering that
the eavesdroppers share their observations freely. Collusion in large wireless networks in all prior works
is also assumed to be perfect [9], [10]. Recently, investigating the ramifications of the collusion models,
the Wiretap Channel with Constrained Colluding Eavesdroppers (WTC-CCE) was proposed [42]: two
colluding eavesdroppers communicate over a virtual collusion channel, in addition to the main point-to-
point communication channel (one legitimate transmitter-receiver pair). Extending the WTC-CCE to the
model at hand can be a natural future work item; however, this is not trivial due to the complexity of
both models.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: The proof is based on the random coding scheme, which combines Csiszar and Korner’s
scheme [18] and DF strategy (two-stage block Markov superposition coding). For decoding at the receivers
we utilize backward decoding [4].1 We prove the theorem by using the replacement X1 for U1 and then the
general case can be proved using a memoryless prefix channel as [23]. Also, as mentioned in Remark 1,
1This scheme first proposed for a relay-eavesdropper channel in [23] and extended to multiple relays with an eavesdropper
in [25].
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we assume Rs = R1. Consider a block Markov encoding scheme with B blocks of transmission, each
of nt symbols. A sequence of B − 1 messages, m1,b, b = 1, 2, . . . , B − 1, each selected independently
and uniformly over M1 is to be sent over the channel in ntB transmissions. Note that as B →∞, the
average rate R1(B − 1)/B is arbitrarily close to R1.
Codebook Generation: Fix a joint p.m.f as (15). Let Rw = min{ min
i∈T \{1}
I(X1;Y
l
i |U), I(U,X1;Y lnl)}.
Generate 2ntRw i.i.d unt sequences, each with probability
nt∏
j=1
p(uj). Index them as unt(m′1, s′) where
m′1 ∈ [1 : 2ntR1 ] and s′ ∈ [1 : 2nt(Rw−R1)]. For each unt(m′1, s′), generate 2ntRw conditionally i.i.d xnt1
sequences, according to probability
nt∏
j=1
p(x1,j|uj). Index them as xnt1 (m′1, s′,m1, s), where m1 ∈ [1 :
2ntR1 ] and s ∈ [1 : 2nt(Rw−R1)]. s is the randomness index used to protect u based on the Wyner code
partitioning method.
Encoding (at the beginning of block b): Let m1,b be the new message to be sent from the source
node in block b. The stochastic encoder at the source uniformly randomly chooses sb and transmits
xnt1 (m1,b−1, sb−1,m1,b, sb). Each relay node i ∈ T \{1} knows the estimates m1,b−1, sb−1 of the messages
the source sent in the previous block; hence, it picks unt(m1,b−1, sb−1) and sends
nt∏
j=1
p(xi,j |uj). We
assume that in the first block, cooperative information is m1,b−1 = m1,0 = 1 and in the last block, a
previously known message m1,b = m1,B = 1 is transmitted.
Decoding (at the end of block b): Each relay node i ∈ T \ {1} wants to correctly recover m1,b, sb.
Hence, it seeks a unique pair (m˜1,b, s˜b) such that
(xnt1 (m1,b−1, sb−1, m˜1,b, s˜b), u
nt(m1,b−1, sb−1), y
l
i(b)) ∈ Antǫ (X1, U, Y li )
Considering the first term of Rw and using the covering lemma [4], this can be done with small enough
probability of error if nt is sufficiently large. Backward decoding is used at the destination node nl,
hence it starts decoding after all B blocks are received. Using its channel output at the end of block b,
i.e., ylnl(b), the decoder at the destination looks for a unique pair m˜1,b−1, s˜b−1 and such that
(xnt1 (m˜1,b−1, s˜b−1,m1,b, sb), u
nt(m˜1,b−1, s˜b−1), y
l
nl(b)) ∈ Antǫ (X1, U, Y lnl)
where m1,b, sb were decoded in the previous step of backward decoding (i.e., block b + 1). Similarly,
considering the second term in Rw for large enough nt, the probability of error can be made sufficiently
small.
Analysis of information leakage rate: Let j∗ = argmin
j∈Ne
{Rw − I(U,U1;Y ej )} and consider the mutual
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information between M1 and (Y ej∗)nt
.
= Ye, averaged over the random codebook C.
I(M1;Y
e|C)=H(M1|C)−H(M1|Ye, C)
=ntR1 −H(M1, S|Ye, C) +H(S|M1,Ye, C)
=ntR1 −H(M1, S|C) + I(M1, S;Ye|C) +H(S|M1,Ye, C)
=ntR1 − ntRw + I(M1, S, Unt ,Xnt1 ;Ye|C) +H(S|M1,Ye, C)
≤ntR1 − ntRw + I(M1, S, Unt ,Xnt1 , C;Ye) +H(S|M1,Ye, C)
(a)
≤ntR1 − ntRw + ntI(U,X1;Y ej∗) +H(S|M1,Ye, C)
(b)
≤nt(R1 −Rw + I(U,X1;Y ej∗) +Rw −R1 − I(U,X1;Y ej∗) + ε)
≤ntε
(a) holds because M1, S, C → Unt ,Xnt1 → Ye forms a Markov chain and thanks to the memoryless
property. (b) follows because by using [4, Lemma 22.1], we have: if Rw − R1 ≥ I(U,X1;Y ej∗), then
H(S|M1,Ye, C) ≤ nt(Rw−R1− I(U,X1;Y ej∗)+ε). This condition, after applying prefix channel, gives
(14).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: The achievable secrecy rate in Lemma 1 can be extended to the Gaussian case with continuous
alphabets (and so to our network model) by standard arguments [43]. We constrain all the inputs to be
Gaussian. For certain βi, i ∈ [1 : nr + 1], consider the following mapping for the generated codebook in
Lemma 1 with respect to the p.m.f (15), which contains a simple Gaussian version of the block Markov
superposition coding where all relay nodes send the same common RV (shown by U ). However, they
adjust their power and use beamforming.
U ∼ CN (0, P˜u) and U˜1 ∼ CN (0, P˜1)
X1 = U˜1 + β1U and Xi = βiU, i ∈ [2 : nr + 1]
Parameter β1 determines the amount of P˜1 dedicated to construct the basis of cooperation, while param-
eters βi, i ∈ [2 : nr +1] are the beamforming coefficients. Applying the power constraint in (4) to above
mapping, we obtain
P˜1 + ‖B‖22P˜u ≤ P tot. (41)
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Now, it is sufficient to evaluate the mutual information terms in (14) by using this mapping and the
network model in (1) and (2), to reach (16).
APPENDIX C
Lemma 8: Consider a Poisson RV X with parameter λ.
Pr(X ≥ x) ≤ e
−λ(eλ)x
xx
for x > λ
And hence For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1):
lim
λ→∞
Pr(X ≤ (1− ǫ)λ) = 0, (42)
lim
λ→∞
Pr(X ≤ (1 + ǫ)λ) = 1. (43)
Proof: See [9] for proofs based on applying Chernoff bound and Chebyshev’s inequality.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. Therefore, we only highlight the differences.
Here, a serial (nl−1)-stage block Markov coding is used.2 Without loss of generality and for simplicity,
we choose the identity permutation and prove the achievability of
min
j∈Ne
min
i∈[1:nl−1]
I(U i1;Y
l
i+1|Unl−1i+1 )− I(Unl−11 ;Y ej )
Moreover, we use the replacement Xi for Ui in the proof and then the general case can be proved using
a memoryless prefix channel as [23]. A sequence of B−nl+2 messages, m1,b, b = 1, 2, . . . , B−nl+2,
each selected independently and uniformly over M1 is to be sent over the channel in ntB transmission.
Note that as B →∞, the average rate R1(B − nl + 2)/B is arbitrarily close to R1.
Codebook Generation: Fix a joint p.m.f as (27). Define wι = (m1,ι, sι) where m1,ι ∈ [1 : 2ntR1 ] and
sι ∈ [1 : 2nt(Rw−R1)] and Rw = min
i∈[1:nl−1]
I(Xi1;Y
l
i+1|Xnl−1i+1 ). Generate 2ntRw i.i.d xntnl−1(wnl−1) where
wnl−1 ∈ [1 : 2ntRw ]. For each xntnl−1(wnl−1), generate 2ntRw conditionally i.i.d xntnl−2(wnl−1, wnl−2)
where wnl−2 ∈ [1 : 2ntRw ]. Continuing in this way, at each node i ∈ [1 : nl−2], for each (xnti+1(wi+1, . . .
, wnl−1), . . . , x
nt
nl−1(wnl−1)) generate 2
ntRw conditionally i.i.d xnti (wi, . . . , wnl−1) where wi ∈ [1 :
2ntRw ]. Since we use sliding-window decoding, we repeat this process nl − 1 times and generate nl − 1
2The scheme for the multiple relay networks is first proposed in [7], [38] and then extended to multiple relays with an
eavesdropper in [25].
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random codebooks which in block b we use the (b mod nl − 1)th codebook to make the error events
independent.
Encoding (at the beginning of block b): Let m1,b be the new message to be sent from the source node
in block b. The stochastic encoder at the source uniformly randomly chooses sb and setting w(b) =
(m1,b, sb) transmits xnt1 (w(1), . . . , w(nl − 1)). Each node i ∈ [1 : nl − 1] knows the estimations of
w(b − r + 1), r ≥ i + 1 (from the decoding part) and transmits xnti (w(b − i), . . . , w(b − nl + 1)). We
assume that w(b) = 1, B − nl + 3 ≤ b ≤ B.
Decoding (at the end of block b): Each node i ∈ [2 : nl] wants to correctly recover w(b − i + 1).
Hence, it looks for a unique index w˜(b− i+ 1) such that for all k = 1, . . . , i− 1 satisfy
(xnti−1−k(w˜(b− i+ 1), w(b − i), . . . , w(b − k − nl + 1)), . . . , xntnl−1(w(b− k − nl + 1)), yli(b− k))
∈ Antǫ (Xi−1−k, . . . ,Xnl−1, Y li )
If nt is large enough, it can be shown from Rw, the covering lemma [4] and the independent codebooks
over (nl− 1) adjacent block, the probability of error can be made sufficiently small. The analysis of the
information leakage rate can be done same as in the proof of Lemma 1, by defining U = Xnl−12 .
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, we compute (27), with an appropriate choice of the
input distribution by constraining all the inputs to be Gaussian. For each q ∈ [1 : nl − 1], define
Bq = [β
′
1q, . . . , β
′
qq] ∈ Cq for β′qq = 1 and certain β′kq, k ∈ [1 : q−1] and consider the following mapping
for the generated codebook in Lemma 4 with respect to the p.m.f (27),
U˜q ∼ CN (0, P˜q) , q ∈ [1 : nl − 1] (44)
Xk =
nl−1∑
q=k
β′kqU˜q = U˜k +
nl−1∑
q=k+1
β′kqU˜q , k ∈ [1 : nl − 1] (45)
Each node k (considering the ordered set of transmitters k ∈ [1 : nl − 1]) in each block b transmits a
linear combination of the decoded codewords in the nl− k previous blocks (shown by U˜q(wb−q+1), k ≤
q ≤ nl−1). These codewords make the coherent transmission between this node k and node i, 1 ≤ i < k
to each node q, k < q ≤ nl− 1. Beamforming using parameters β′kq is applied by adjusting the power of
these codewords. Applying the power constraint in (4) to the above mapping, we obtain
P tot≥
nl−1∑
k=1
nl−1∑
q=k
|β′kq|2P˜q =
nl−1∑
q=1
q∑
k=1
|β′kq|2P˜q =
nl−1∑
q=1
‖Bq‖22P˜q (46)
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Using this mapping, (1) and (2), and applying interchangings in the order of summations similar to (46),
deriving the mutual information terms in (27) completes the proof.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Proof: First, we consider a Discrete Memoryless version of the SN -PCE and derive an achievable
secure aggregate rate RDMs in Lemma 9. The proof is based on using (nl−1)-stage block Markov coding
(serial DF relaying) and Wyner wiretap coding and is given in Appendix G. Without loss of generality,
let Nl = {1, . . . , nl}. In the serial relaying scheme, the transmitted signal of each node i can be decoded
in all subsequent nodes (i+1 to nl). Hence, it can decode the transmitted signals of nodes 1 to i−1 [39].
Next, we extend RDMs to SN -PCE in Lemma 10 and call it Rs. Finally, we apply ZF to Rs and we
obtain RZFs . Similar to the non-colluding case, we need clustering to apply ZF at the eavesdroppers. Each
cluster determines the priority of decoding (starting from the source node). This means that the nodes
in each cluster form a group of relays with the same priority; this enables them to act as a distributed
multi-antenna to collectively apply ZF. Here, our rate expressions show the collusion effect. In Step 2,
we adjust the size of the clusters to combat the collusion effect.
Lemma 9: Consider the general discrete memoryless counterpart of SN -PCE, given by some con-
ditional distribution p(yl2, . . . , ylnl ,y
e|x1, . . . , xnl), and let π(·) be a permutation on Nl = {1, . . . , nl},
where π(1) = 1, π(nl) = nl and π(m : n) = {π(m), π(m + 1), . . . , π(n)}. The secrecy capacity is
lower-bounded by:
RDMs = supmax
π(·)
min
i∈[1:nl−1]
I(Uπ(1:i);Y
l
π(i+1)|Uπ(i+1:nl−1))− I(Uπ(1:nl−1);Ye) (47)
where the supremum is taken over all joint p.m.fs of the form
p(u1, . . . , unl−1)
nl−1∏
k=1
p(xk|uk). (48)
Now, we extend the above lemma to SN -PCE, using an appropriate codebook mapping based on Gaussian
RVs in the following lemma (proof is provided in Appendix H).
Lemma 10: For SN -PCE, the following secure aggregate rate is achievable.
Rs = min
i∈[1:nl−1]
max
Bi,P˜i
log(1 +
i∑
q=1
|
q∑
k=1
hlk,i+1β
′
kq|2P˜q
N l
)− log(1 +
∑
j∈Ne
nl−1∑
q=1
|
q∑
k=1
hek,jβ
′
kq|2P˜q
N e
) (49)
where (33) and (36) hold.
October 8, 2018 DRAFT
30
The serial relaying scheme overcomes the decoding constraint at the farthest relay by ordering the relays.
Hence, all nodes in the network (except the source and destination) can be used as the relays; thus,
T = {1, . . . , nl − 1}. From (49), we see that the optimal beamforming strategy is the one that results in
max over the beamforming coefficient vectorB. Finding the closed form solution is an open problem [28].
Hence, we choose to ZF at the colluding eavesdroppers by letting
nl−1∑
q=2
|
q∑
k=1
hek,jβ
′
kq|2P˜q = 0,∀j ∈ Ne.
This results in P˜q = 0 or E(q, j) =
q∑
k=1
hek,jβ
′
kq = 0, for ∀q ∈ [2 : nl − 1]. Now we show that indeed
clustering is needed by deriving the power allocation in (35). One can obtain Xk = U˜k + βkXk+1 from
(51), where β′kq =
q−1∏
m=k
βm. Therefore, it is seen that E(q0, j) and E(q0+1, j) only differ in one variable,
i.e., βq0+1. However, to apply ZF, E(q, j) must be equal to zero for all j ∈ Ne if P˜q > 0, which is
clearly not possible. Therefore, we set P˜q = 0 if q mod ne 6= 1 and leave only one equation needing
to be satisfied, i.e, E(q, j) = 0 if q mod ne = 1∀j ∈ Ne, in every ne equations. Therefore, power
allocation in (35) makes the ZF possible. Thus, the coefficient vector Bq must lie in the null space of
HNe,T q , i.e, HNe,T qBq = 0, which is given in (34). (32) is resulted from applying (34) on (49). To
summarize: in order to overcome ne eavesdroppers, every ne nodes form a cluster, where they transmit
the same information in each block (equal part of fresh information) and they apply beamforming to ZF
all eavesdroppers. To complete the proof, it is enough to derive the total power constraint (36) already
given in Lemma 10.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 9
Proof: The proof is similar to Lemma 4. The difference is in the analysis of the information leakage
rate. Therefore, we only provide this analysis for brevity. Consider the mutual information between M1
and (Ye)nt , averaged over the random codebook C.
I (M1; (Y
e)nt |C) = H(M1|C)−H(M1|(Ye)nt , C)
=ntR1 −H(M1, S|(Ye)nt , C) +H(S|M1, (Ye)nt , C)
=ntR1 −H(M1, S|C) + I(M1, S; (Ye)nt |C)
+H(S|M1, (Ye)nt , C)
=ntR1 − ntRw + I(M1, S, Unt ,Xnt1 ; (Ye)nt |C)
+H(S|M1, (Ye)nt , C)
≤ntR1 − ntRw + I(M1, S, Unt ,Xnt1 , C; (Ye)nt)
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+H(S|M1, (Ye)nt , C)
(a)
≤ntR1 − ntRw + ntI(U,X1;Ye) +H(S|M1, (Ye)nt , C)
(b)
≤nt(R1 −Rw + I(U,X1;Ye) +Rw −R1 − I(U,X1;Ye) + ε)
≤ntε
(a) holds because M1, S, C → Unt ,Xnt1 → (Ye)nt forms a Markov chain and thanks to the memoryless
property. (b) follows because by using [4, Lemma 22.1], we have: if Rw − R1 ≥ I(U,X1;Ye), then
H(S|M1, (Ye)nt , C) ≤ nt(Rw −R1 − I(U,X1;Ye) + ε).
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 10
Proof: Using standard arguments, we can extend (47), by computing it for an appropriate choice of
the input distribution and constraining all the inputs to be Gaussian [43]. The mapping is same as the one
in Lemma 5, which is repeated here for completeness (since it is needed in deriving the beamforming
vector).
For each q ∈ [1 : nl − 1], define Bq = [β′1q, . . . , β′qq] ∈ Cq for β′qq = 1 and certain β′kq, k ∈ [1 : q − 1]
and consider the following mapping for the generated codebook in Lemma 9 with respect to the p.m.f
(48),
U˜q ∼ CN (0, P˜q) , q ∈ [1 : nl − 1] (50)
Xk =
nl−1∑
q=k
β′kqU˜q = U˜k +
nl−1∑
q=k+1
β′kqU˜q , k ∈ [1 : nl − 1] (51)
Each node k (considering the ordered set of transmitters k ∈ [1 : nl − 1]) in each block b transmits a
linear combination of the decoded codewords in the nl− k previous blocks (shown by U˜q(wb−q+1), k ≤
q ≤ nl−1). These codewords make the coherent transmission between this node k and node i, 1 ≤ i < k
to each node q, k < q ≤ nl− 1. Beamforming using parameters β′kq is applied by adjusting the power of
these codewords. Applying the power constraint in (4) to the above mapping, we obtain
P tot≥
nl−1∑
k=1
nl−1∑
q=k
|β′kq|2P˜q =
nl−1∑
q=1
q∑
k=1
|β′kq|2P˜q =
nl−1∑
q=1
‖Bq‖22P˜q
Using this mapping, (1) and (2), applying interchangings in the order of summations, and deriving the
mutual information terms in (47) completes the proof.
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